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WAR.
The way in which the conception of a single, or independent combat, is more closely determined, the
conditions to which this unit is attached, we shall only be able to explain clearly when we consider the
combat; we must content ourselves for the present with saying that in relation to space, therefore in combats
taking place at the same time, the unit reaches just as far as PERSONAL COMMAND reaches; but in regard
to time, and therefore in relation to combats which follow each other in close succession, it reaches to the
moment when the crisis which takes place in every combat is entirely passed.
That doubtful cases may occur, cases, for instance, in which several combats may perhaps be regarded also as
a single one, will not overthrow the ground of distinction we have adopted, for the same is the case with all
grounds of distinction of real things which are differentiated by a gradually diminishing scale. There may,
therefore, certainly be acts of activity in War which, without any alteration in the point of view, may just as
well be counted strategic as tactical; for example, very extended positions resembling a chain of posts, the
preparations for the passage of a river at several points,
Our classification reaches and covers only the USE OF THE MILITARY FORCE. But now there are in War
a number of activities which are subservient to it, and still are quite different from it; sometimes closely
allied, sometimes less near in their affinity. All these activities relate to the MAINTENANCE OF THE
MILITARY FORCE. In the same way as its creation and training precede its use, so its maintenance is
always a necessary condition. But, strictly viewed, all activities thus connected with it are always to be
regarded only as preparations for fighting; they are certainly nothing more than activities which are very
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close to the action, so that they run through the hostile act alternate in importance with the use of the forces.
We have therefore a right to exclude them as well as the other preparatory activities from the Art of War in its
restricted sense, from the conduct of War properly so called; and we are obliged to do so if we would comply
with the first principle of all theory, the elimination of all heterogeneous elements. Who would include in the
real "conduct of War" the whole litany of subsistence and administration, because it is admitted to stand in
constant reciprocal action with the use of the troops, but is something essentially different from it?
We have said, in the third chapter of our first book, that as the fight or combat is the only directly effective
activity, therefore the threads of all others, as they end in it, are included in it. By this we meant to say that to
all others an object was thereby appointed which, in accordance with the laws peculiar to themselves, they
must seek to attain. Here we must go a little closer into this subject.
The subjects which constitute the activities outside of the combat are of various kinds.
The one part belongs, in one respect, to the combat itself, is identical with it, whilst it serves in another
respect for the maintenance of the military force. The other part belongs purely to the subsistence, and has
only, in consequence of the reciprocal action, a limited influence on the combats by its results. The subjects
which in one respect belong to the fighting itself are MARCHES, CAMPS, and CANTONMENTS, for they
suppose so many different situations of troops, and where troops are supposed there the idea of the combat
must always be present.
The other subjects, which only belong to the maintenance, are SUBSISTENCE, CARE OF THE SICK, the
SUPPLY AND REPAIR OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT.
Marches are quite identical with the use of the troops. The act of marching in the combat, generally called
manoeuvring, certainly does not necessarily include the use of weapons, but it is so completely and
necessarily combined with it that it forms an integral part of that which we call a combat. But the march
outside the combat is nothing but the execution of a strategic measure. By the strategic plan is settled WHEN,
WHERE, and WITH WHAT FORCES a battle is to be delivered--and to carry that into execution the march
is the only means.
The march outside of the combat is therefore an instrument of strategy, but not on that account exclusively a
subject of strategy, for as the armed force which executes it may be involved in a possible combat at any
moment, therefore its execution stands also under tactical as well as strategic rules. If we prescribe to a
column its route on a particular side of a river or of a branch of a mountain, then that is a strategic measure,
for it contains the intention of fighting on that particular side of the hill or river in preference to the other, in
case a combat should be necessary during the march.
But if a column, instead of following the road through a valley, marches along the parallel ridge of heights, or
for the convenience of marching divides itself into several columns, then these are tactical arrangements, for
they relate to the manner in which we shall use the troops in the anticipated combat.
The particular order of march is in constant relation with readiness for combat, is therefore tactical in its
nature, for it is nothing more than the first or preliminary disposition for the battle which may possibly take
place.
As the march is the instrument by which strategy apportions its active elements, the combats, but these last
often only appear by their results and not in the details of their real course, it could not fail to happen that in
theory the instrument has often been substituted for the efficient principle. Thus we hear of a decisive skilful
march, allusion being thereby made to those combat- combinations to which these marches led. This
substitution of ideas is too natural and conciseness of expression too desirable to call for alteration, but still it
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is only a condensed chain of ideas in regard to which we must never omit to bear in mind the full meaning, if
we would avoid falling into error.
We fall into an error of this description if we attribute to strategical combinations a power independent of
tactical results. We read of marches and manoeuvres combined, the object attained, and at the same time not a
word about combat, from which the conclusion is drawn that there are means in War of conquering an enemy
without fighting. The prolific nature of this error we cannot show until hereafter.
But although a march can be regarded absolutely as an integral part of the combat, still there are in it certain
relations which do not belong to the combat, and therefore are neither tactical nor strategic. To these belong
all arrangements which concern only the accommodation of the troops, the construction of bridges, roads,
These are only conditions; under many circumstances they are in very close connection, and may almost
identify themselves with the troops, as in building a bridge in presence of the enemy; but in themselves they
are always activities, the theory of which does not form part of the theory of the conduct of War.
Camps, by which we mean every disposition of troops in concentrated, therefore in battle order, in
contradistinction to cantonments or quarters, are a state of rest, therefore of restoration; but they are at the
same time also the strategic appointment of a battle on the spot, chosen; and by the manner in which they are
taken up they contain the fundamental lines of the battle, a condition from which every defensive battle starts;
they are therefore essential parts of both strategy and tactics. [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]